I have come across the fascinating argument that the Bush presidency is influenced by Machiavellian ideas, particularly Machiavelli’s emphasis on a strong and energetic executive power. Harvey Mansfield, a leading scholar of Machiavelli, has defended Bush’s increased use of the executive power. Here are some questions I thought of reading his piece.

To counter enemies, a republic must have and use force adequate to a greater threat than comes from criminals, who may be quite patriotic if not public-spirited, and have nothing against the law when applied to others besides themselves. But enemies, being extra-legal, need to be faced with extra-legal force. …A strong executive is one that is not confined to executing the laws but has extra-legal powers such as commanding the military, making treaties (and carrying on foreign policy), and pardoning the convicted, not to mention a veto of legislation.

If I am not mistaken by my reading of the Constitution, these are not extra-legal powers but specifically granted. How is Mansfield using “extra-legal” here?
Further:

In Machiavelli’s terms, ordinary power needs to be supplemented or corrected by the extraordinary power of a prince, using wise discretion….We need both the rule of law and the power to escape it–and that twofold need is just what the Constitution provides for.

Well, if the Constitution provides those “extralegal” powers, how are they not within the rule of law? That is, if the Constitution provides a way to circumvent it, does it not allow that circumvention? And, if the constitution does allow for emergency or extraordinary powers given to the executive in times of emergency, is that not a better way than simply to give the executive discretionary use of power when necessary? By employing the check of those extraordinary powers through Congress for example, do we not ensure that those powers are used judiciously instead of abused? Discretion seems to be a naive policy given history’s track record of abuses of power even within republican regimes.
And:

The Framers made a strong executive in order to have both power and security, and they took note of emergency occasions when more power gives more security.

This may be so, but does that justify the current increase in executive power (i.e. enemy combatants, Patriot Act)? Part of the problem is that the nature of the security threat is very different from that faced by republics in the past. The war against terrorism is is no ordinary war; it is more like a prolonged state of disease which we cannot cure but only alleviate. How should that affect executive prerogative? Permanent expansion of executive power on the basis of such a war seems more dangerous than the six months dictatorial rule the Roman republic had at some point in time.
Finally:

We note that President Bush’s critics do not want him to stop surveillance; they just want him to do it legally–as if legality could guarantee success and morality could make our enemies give up.

I don’t think that the arguments against the President’s surveillance use is that legality would ensure success. The point is rather that when someone acts within the realm of legality, he is acting on a power specifically granted to him. We grant powers because we think they are necessary powers to have in order to govern well.
Here are some more links on this topic:
Future of Freedom Foundation
darwinianconservatism.blogspot.com
Economist